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Between 2004 and 2008 low-interest foreign currency based loans, and above all 
household loans, became more and more popular in Central European countries like 
Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries in an environment of 
high and volatile inflation but stabilising and in some cases appreciating exchange 
rate. (Király–Simonovits, 2015) The stable outlook for the exchange rate was further 
strengthened by the prospect of euro adoption. When the global financial crisis hit 
Europe, however, Central European economies went under a strong currency 
depreciation and decline in income, interest and principal payments put a much 
greater burden on debtors than previously. The situation was further deteriorated by 
the decision of the Swiss National Bank to abandon the cap of its currency’s value 
against the euro. After the comparison of the extent of depreciation and the 
dynamics of household FX loans based on central bank data, the paper examines 
the economic policy measures taken by Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania to 
protect debtors from the increasing debt burden with special emphasis on the 
leading role of the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) having been widely 
acknowledged by international organisations (IMF, 2016, European Commisson, 
2016a). 
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Introduction  
The excessive demand for foreign currency loans in the CEECs before the global 
financial crisis was not an unprecedented phenomenon.  Foreign currency loans 
among commercial debt obligations extended by foreign banks also contributed to 
the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980’s (A. Cavallo–Fernández-Arias, 2013) and 
dollarised (euroised) countries have often relied on FX resources ever since. Foreign 
currency debt amounts to some 10% of non-financial sector loans provided by 
resident financial institutions also in the euro area (Ongena et al., 2014).  The 
dynamics of foreign currency lending to households in the CEECs in the years 2004-
2008, however, has exceeded the pace ever recorded in Europe. These countries 
with the full liberalisation of the capital accounts attracted cross-border capital 
inflows and banking operations which at the same time restricted preventive policy 
actions. The paper examines the dynamics and costs of foreign currency lending 
and the macroprudential measures of the selected countries as responses to the 
problem.  
 Among the reasons for this proliferation of FX financing in the region, the volatility 
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currency (Király–Simonovits, 2015), the relatively low foreign currency interest rate 
(European Commission, 2016b) and interest volatility (Schepp–Pitz, 2013) it entailed, 
the loan supply boom it triggers (Király–Simonovits, 2015) and the restrictive monetary 
policy accounting for the relatively high domestic interest rates creating a 
permanent advantage of FX loans compared to domestic currency loans (Brzoza–
Brzezina et al., 2010) were highlighted in the literature. Interest parity conditions were 
either disregarded by borrowers of such loans or, as Király and Simonovits (2015) 
suggest, the prospect of eurozone membership meant such stability for the domestic 
currency that no depreciation equivalent to the interest rate differential was 
expected. Furthermore, Király and Simonovits (2015) emphasise two further factors 
which prevent the interest rate parity condition to be satisfied: on the one hand, 
foreign currency premium may prevail for a long term due to country-specific risk, on 
the other hand, term premia materialising between different maturities might also 
persistently allow a less strong depreciation than the interest rate parity condition 
would require. This altogether strengthened the attractiveness of FX loans and even 
pushed some investors to get involved in speculative carry trade activity. Foreign 
currency lending was also boosted by the often loose lending policy of banks. (Bierut 
et al., 2015) 
 Substitution of domestic and foreign currency loans constrains monetary policy in 
materially influencing the volume of credit in the economy and in providing financial 
stability making the credit and interest rate channel of monetary policy less 
effective, distorting information on monetary and credit aggregates which are 
important to assess real and nominal developments even in an inflation targeting 
environment. (Brzoza–Brzezina et al., 2010). In addition it entails substantial risks, first of 
all exchange rate risk, which turns to credit risk in case of a significant depreciation 
of the domestic currency and worsening of the income situation of borrowers. In 
many countries FX loan borrowers had no natural hedge – that is assets producing 
foreign currency income or wage income in foreign currency – which could have 
helped them manage FX exposure. Though the depreciation shock hitting 
households did not necessarily erode the welfare advantage of foreign currency 
debtors compared to domestic currency debtors, as the interest and principal 
payment slipped, or even multiplicated, the number of debtors with payment 
difficulties and the volume of the non-performing loan portfolio of banks started to 
soar. The increase in NPL ratios together with increasing real estate prices and 
reliance on foreign financing can lead to systemic risk (Bierut et al., 2015) stimulating 
the supervisory authority and finally central banks to take preventive or corrective 
measures to protect financial stability. Moreover, credit institutions only partly 
covered their open positions with foreign liabilities, they often resorted to the 
derivatives market – FX swap and CIRS – to hedge their FX exposure and when 
implied foreign currency interest rates increased, they had to face increased rollover 
costs posing further risk to the banking system. 
  
Methodology  
The foreign currency loan accumulation and its consequences in Croatia, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania is discussed with the help of literature survey and descriptive 
data analysis mainly based on central bank studies and data supplemented with 
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Results  
Due to the excessive foreign currency lending dynamics in the household sector 
(reaching a 5-10% monthly nominal growth in Hungary and 2-6% in Poland between 
2005 and 2009, and around 6% in Romania in 2007-2008), the share of foreign 
currency loans in the total household loan portfolio of Hungary, Poland and Romania 
sharply increased especially after 2005 and only regulatory measures after the crisis 
could suppress this share to or under pre-crisis levels. (Figure 1) Within this foreign 
currency loan portfolio especially CHF-denominated mortgage loans carried high 
risk due to their rapid accumulation, and thus high weight and often poor quality.  
Due to historical reasons – repatriation of foreign income in war times – Croatia has 
been characterised by a high level of euroisation which thanks to regulatory 
changes – e.g. closing the gap between reserve requirement on kuna and foreign 
currency liabilities – seemed to come to a hault and accelerated again after the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis. (Galac, 2012). In Croatia the measures taken 
to mitigate systemic risk were partly also aimed at the de-euroisation of the 
economy. Moreover, in Hungary an almost complete meltdown of household FX 
loans can be observable after 2015 as a result of policy commitment to the entire 
phasing out of such loans. 
  
Figure 1 
Foreign currency household loans to total household loans  
 
 
Source: MNB, NBP, NBR, IMF, own illustration 
Note: In the case of Hungary data cover the whole household sector, whereas in 
Poland and Romania data refer to credit by MFIs and Croatian data had to be 
substituted with total loans of the economy without sectoral breakdown from the IMF 
FSI database. The latter seemed to be a good approximation compared to some 
available annual data from credit institutions’ non-consolidated balance sheet. 
 The enhanced cost of foreign currency loans can be best illustrated by the abrupt 
depreciation of domestic currencies against the Swiss franc from the second half of 
2008 which continued at a lower but persistent pace until the unpegging of the Swiss 
franc in January 2015 which caused a one-time drop again (Figure 2). The Hungarian 
forint went under the most significant weakening, it lost some 40% of its end-of-2004 
value by 2015, at the same time causing the greatest increase in the debt burden of 
borrowers. As regards interest payments, comparing average interest rates on 
mortgage loans (Figure 3) one can easily conclude that again Hungarian debtors 
were the most affected by the worsening economic outlook and escalating risk 
exposure. According to Schepp and Pitz (2013) the reason for the spectacular 
increase in loan interest rates in Hungary lay in the growing CDS spreads, the 
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financial institutions which caused a broadening premium compared to the CHF 
interbank reference rates as basis price for foreign currency funding.   
 
Figure 2 
Currency exchange rates against Swiss franc between 2005-2016 (December 
2014=100%) 
 
Source: Stooq, own illustration 
 
Figure 3 
Annual weighted average mortgage loan interest rates (2005-2016) 
 
 
Source: European Mortgage Federation, CNB 
Note: In the absence of comparable data in the case of Croatia, the CNB’s annual 
average household housing FX- indexed loan interest rates were used (FX-indexed 
loans account for some 80-90 per cent of all home and mortgage loans). 
 
Discussion  
Some macroprudential policy responses in the CEECs 
As the crisis hit the central and eastern part of Europe causing significant currency 
depreciation and fall in (real) income it became evident that the previously 
accumulated FX loans – especially those taken by households – bears a significant 
risk which might jeopardise financial stability. Monetary and supervisory authorities in 
the region started taking measures to tackle the problem of foreign currency loans, 
they issued recommendations or co-operated with the legislation. 
 Without aiming to give an all exhaustive list of measures taken by Central and 
Eastern European authorities, some important elements of their intervention is worth 
emphasising. From as early as 2005 the National Bank of Romania started imposing 
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severe as regards loans granted in a currency different from the currency in which 
the borrower earned its wage income.  In addition, in 2008 lending norms had to be 
amended to take account of the materialisation of exchange rate and interest rate 
risk or a substantial change in the fees and commissions charged by credit 
institutions. The NBR constantly issued public warnings – e. g. in the Financial Stability 
Reports – regarding FX loans with special emphasis on CHF denominated loans. In 
Romania the recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on 
lending in foreign currencies (2011) were also incorporated in the national legislation 
by establishing maximum indebtedness level for consumer loans, imposing collateral 
thresholds and capping on LTV ratios. (NBR, 2015) The NBR also resorted to traditional 
measures, such as changing the reserve requirement on FX liabilities to forego 
potential risk to financial stability arising from FX loans. Overall, the prudential 
measures taken in Romania were acknowledged by international organisations (e. 
g. IMF, see Jácome and Mitra, 2015).  
 In Hungary the central bank played an active role above all by supporting the 
policy of the government in the different periods of phasing out FX loans from 
participating in the legal preparatory activity to holding foreign exchange tenders 
for banks. At the MNB’s initiative, in 2009 a government decree on the conditions of 
prudent retail lending and the examination of creditworthiness set limits to FX lending 
by maximising loan-to-value ratios and specifying requirements concerning the 
debtor’s income situation supplemented by a decree of the governor of the MNB 
further restricting LTV and PTI ratios in the case of consumer loans. In 2011 financial 
regulations were amended in connection with the restriction of credit interest rates 
and for ensuring transparent pricing mechanisms with special regard to mortgage 
loans requiring that such loans have to bear either fixed interest rate or be linked to a 
variable reference rate. This was followed by a new act on „fair banking” entering 
into effect in 2015 which stipulated conditions to be considered when modifying the 
interest rate applied. There were a lot of efforts made to rescue late-paying 
borrowers through, among others, the introduction of exchange rate cap. In 
addition, under very strict circumstances FX loans could be converted into forint on 
request until May 2012, and FX borrowers could also participate in the early 
repayment of loans in which the Central Bank of Hungary provided credit institutions 
with the foreign currency necessary for refunding their foreign currency liabilities. 
(MNB, 2012) 
 Primarily due to the sharp increase in FX loans, especially in mortgage lending, 
Poland also introduced stricter prudential regulations. It raised the minimum risk 
weight for FX mortgage loans in 2007 and then again in 2012. (Jácome–Mitra, 2015) 
Polish banking regulators also issued recommendations to improve credit risk 
management. The outright legal ban on FX loans was also considered in Poland, but 
finally regulators rather squeezed lenders by moral suasion to put an end to FX 
mortgage lending. Credit risk management was strengthened through numerous 
regulations capping DTI and LTV ratios or obliging banks to establish own DTI limits 
and requiring stricter creditworthiness analysis. As these decisions were made by the 
supervisory authority (PSBA), the National Bank of Poland could influence these 
processes mostly as an advisor and by constantly monitoring systemic risk. The 
measures helped curbing and finally eliminating the extensive demand for FX 
mortgage loans. (Bierut et al., 2012) 
 In Croatia the central bank first of all concentrated on keeping a stable exchange 
rate because of the historically high, almost three-fourth ratio of FX loans in total 
loans. The negative tendency in the payment discipline in the FX loan market lead to 
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capital requirement was raised concerning banks’ currency-induced credit risk, the 
risk weight for FX loans for unhedged clients exposed to foreign currency risk was 
lifted. (Brown-de Haas, 2010) The CNB also required banks to purchase CNB bills in 
proportion to excess credit growth in the crisis years and later increased capital 
adequacy requirements simultaneously with the removal of higher risk weights on FX 
loans in 2010. In 2015 the CNB obliged banks to inform consumers about interest and 
currency exposure by calculating monthly instalments and offer a domestic currency 
credit equivalent as their own product or of other banks. (Vujčić–Dumičić, 2015)  
Overall it was a general practice in these countries to consult with the financial 
industry when drafting new prudential measures and modifying existing regulations. 
The ESRB issuing new recommendations in 2011 on lending in foreign currencies built 
upon the principle of resciprocity (obliged EU countries to respect the relevant 
measures introduced by other EU authorities) also helped to partly avoid 
unadvertently benefiting companies applying regulatory arbitrage. (Bierut et al., 
2012) 
   
Conversion of FX loans into domestic currency 
As seen in the comparative statistics, Croatia and Hungary had to face the greatest 
challenge in managing households’ foreign currency indebtedness. The other two 
countries, Poland and Romania did not convert household FX loans into domestic 
loans even after the abolition of the CHF exchange rate cap causing sharp 
depreciation of Central European currencies against Swiss franc. It was a lingering 
issue in Poland but finally the Parliament only discussed bills on consumer 
compensation and on the optional solution for banks to convert FX loans. In 
Romania the Parliament approved a bill on the opportunity of consumers to convert 
Swiss franc loans into lei at the initial exchange rate but finally the constitutional 
court refused it. In Hungary the severity of the situation of FX loan holders can be 
best characterised by the decision of lawmakers to compensate households for 
some extra costs unfairly charged by credit institutions and a full phasing out of FX 
loans. The MNB assumed a great role in the settlement of household FX loans arising 
from the unfair use of exchange rate spread and the contractual clause on 
unilateral contract amendment of consumer loan agreements and the forint 
conversion of these loans by providing the amount of the foreign currency needed 
to cover banks’ hedging requirement in the form of euro sale tenders in 2014 and 
2015 for household mortgage loans and Swiss franc sale tenders for the remaining 
consumer FX loans in 2015. The foreign currency purchased in the MNB tenders by 
credit institutions was rolled over in FX swaps or combined with an opposite CIRS 
transaction, except those banks which directly purchased the euro or CHF without 
rolling it over. The whole household FX loan stock that was affected by the 
conversion amounted to approximately EUR 11-12 billion, whereas banks purchased 
foreign currency at a volume of some EUR 9.6 billion from the MNB (Matolcsy-Palotai, 
2016). Some of the transactions were bound to the condition of reducing short-term 
liabilities of banks. Partly for the burden on households it released and the timing of 
the forint conversion of FX loans (preceding the decision of the Swiss National Bank), 
Hungary’s efforts to stabilise the economy were widely acknowledged by 
international institutions (IMF, 2016, European Commisson, 2016a). 
 As legislation in Croatia enacted the law on the conversion of Swiss franc-indexed 
loans to euro (Act on the Amendments to the Consumer Credit Act) and the partial 
write-off such loans, the Croatian National Bank adjusted its monetary policy to 
ensure foreign currency liquidity for banks by intervening in the foreign exchange 
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household loans indexed to Swiss franc were converted into euro loans and EUR 130 
million worth of loans were written off.) To make up for shrinking domestic currency 
liquidity the CNB also renounced compulsory CNB bill sales and provided banks with 
liquidity by conducting reverse repo operations. With these steps the CNB avoided 
and undesirable depreciation of the domestic currency and a possible liquidity 
shortage in the banking system. Thanks to banks’ deleveraging their foreign currency 
denominated assets exceeded their liabilities for the first time since 2002 (CNB, 2016). 
 
Conclusion  
Foreign currency and foreign currency-indexed household loans became extremely 
popular in the CEECs preceding the 2008 global financial crisis primarily due to their 
low interest rates and the domestic currency’s stability expected to be a long term 
phenomenon. The crisis, however, eroded the great part of the advantages of such 
loans. After a lot of measures aimed at easing the burden on households, Hungarian 
authorities decided to phase out household FX loans entirely. The way of conversion 
of household FX loans into domestic currency can be said to be the most elaborate 
among all the Central and Eastern European Countries and the timing was also lucky 
as it preceded the abolition of the Swiss franc cap. Partial conversion of FX-indexed 
loans also took place in Croatia, whereas Poland and Romania did not resort to such 
direct action, but in these countries a wide range of macroprudential measures 
have been taken even before the outbreak of the crisis. 
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